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all this, seeing that, as Mr. Allen points out, Christianity united in itself all the most vital elements of the religions then current, and all the old religious ideas crystallised around the person of its founder. In the doctrine of the bodily resurrection of Jesus, which is the central idea of Christian teaching, we have a phase of the primitive belief on which corpse-worship is based. The dignity assigned to Christ after his ascension followed naturally from his relationship to Jahveh, who from being the local deity of the Israelites became the Supreme God of the Universe. Mr. Allen explains the steps by which the change took place, and there is no more difficulty in connexion with the process than in the notion of a tribal chief becoming the head of a world-wide empire, especially as it is accompanied by association of the spirit of the dead with the solar body.

There are two aspects of the religious question which require fuller treatment than Mr. Allen has accorded them. The ideas entertained by a people in relation to the deity having developed in the human mind, the general idea of God is thus a kind of mental reflexion, and the genesis of this idea has yet to be definitely traced, although much has been done by Professor Tiele and other writers in this respect. The ethical side of religious development also requires much more consideration, and although Mr. Allen purposely abstains from considering the ethical aspect it is by no means clear that he is justified in doing so, if he wishes to make his treatment of the evolution of the idea of God complete. There is much evidence to show that the supposed desire or will of a deceased chief, that is a human god, is regarded as requiring obedience. If such be the case, worship and offerings are only one aspect of religion, its other aspect being ethical. The moral ideas we ascribe to God are as much a reflexion from our own minds as are the ideas we entertain as to his being.

C. STANILAND WAKE.

THE NON-RELIGION OF THE FUTURE. A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY. Translated from the French of *M. Guyau*. New York: Henry Holt and Company. 1897. Pages, xi, 543. Price, \$3.00.

As pointed out by the author, M. Guyau's present work is intimately related to his earlier ones treating of æsthetics and morals. Beauty, according to his definition, is "perception or an act that stimulates life simultaneously on its three sides—sensibility, intelligence, will—and that produces pleasure by the immediate consciousness of this general stimulation." Hence the æsthetic sentiment is identical with self-conscious life, that is with the life which is conscious of its own subjective intensity and harmony. On the other hand, M. Guyau supposes the moral sentiment to be identical with "a consciousness of the powers and possibilities in the sphere of practice of a life ideal in intensity and breadth of interest," such possibilities relating chiefly to one's power of serving other people. When this consciousness of the social aspect of life is extended so as to embrace the totality of conscious beings, "not only of real and living, but also of possible and ideal beings," the religious sentiment appears. Thus, the essential unity of æsthetics with morals

and religion is to be found in the very notion of life, and of its individual or social manifestations.

The first portion of the present work, which deals with the religious sentiment, is devoted to the origin and evolution of what the author terms *sociological mythology*. The meaning attached to this phrase may be made clear by the author's statement, that religion consists essentially in the establishment of a bond, at first mythical and subsequently mystic, between man and the forces of the universe primitively, afterwards between man and the universe itself, and finally between man and the elements of the universe. Thus religion is regarded as "an imaginative extension, a universalisation of all the good or evil relations which exist among conscious beings, of war and peace, friendship and enmity, obedience and rebellion, protection and authority, submission, fear, respect, devotion, love : . . . a universal *sociomorphism*." M. Guyau condenses his theory into the definition of religion as a universal sociological hypothesis, which endeavors to explain all things by analogies drawn from human society, "imaginatively and symbolically considered." He accepts neither Max Müller's henotheism, with its vague idea of the infinite, nor Von Hartmann's monistic pantheism, both being of modern origin. The religious instinct of M. Renan is equally rejected as being unknown to primitive man, whose only instincts are those of self-preservation and sociability. That which M. Guyau places at the antipodes of Max Müller's theory, the spiritism of Mr. Herbert Spencer, he regards as sufficient to explain the ancestor-worship of primitive peoples, but not the "cult for the gods." The common idea which dominates both these forms of worship we find in "a natural persuasion that nothing is absolutely and definitely inanimate, that everything lives and possesses, therefore, intentions and volitions." Animals and savages, as young children among civilised peoples, look upon nature as a society, and they interpret every movement in nature as caused by desire. This *panthelism*—a term which M. Guyau proposes, in the place of fetishism, to express that primitive phase of human intelligence—represents an earlier stage of belief than the *animism* of Dr. E. B. Tylor. With the former the world is a society of living *bodies*, while with the latter the conception is of distinct souls animating each its own body, which it is capable of quitting. Animism was at one time universal, but "it immediately succeeded fetishism or concrete naturism, the primitive belief, in which animating soul and animated body were not distinguished."

The development of theism from animism M. Guyau regards as inherently necessary. When spirits are capable of separating themselves from the body, and of performing actions mysterious to us, they begin to be divine. Such beings are clairvoyant, however, as well as powerful, and are also either benevolent or hostile. Here we have the germ of the theory of Divine Providence, which later appears as the notion of a general, directing intelligence. By the growth of experience, man gradually forms the conception of an orderly subordination among the different voluntary beings with whom he peoples the earth, a kind of "unification of special

providences," and now "he conceives the world as dependent upon the will of some one or more superior beings who direct it, or suspend at need the ordinary course of things." M. Guyau by no means condemns the belief of primitive man in a Providence and in miracles which accompanies it. When man lives in the supernatural, there exists a sentiment of evil, suffering, and terror, to correct which the believer takes refuge in miracles, and "Providence is thus the primitive means of progress, and man's first hope." Nor are miracles to be regarded as frauds. They may be illusions which science is beginning to explain, or phenomena of the nervous system, and in most cases have a foundation in fact.

The most important feature of the evolution of religion is the development of its sociological and moral aspects. There can be no doubt that originally religion and morals were not related. Wickedness as well as goodness was attributed to the gods, who became divided into two classes recognised respectively as virtuous and wicked. Finally, however, the principle of goodness established its superiority under the name of God, who became "the personification of the moral law and the moral sanction, the sovereign legislator and judge, in a word, the living law of universal society, as a king is the living law in a human society." The worship of God assumes certain fixed forms which are considered essential, and their establishment as rites necessitates a priesthood, which tends to become hereditary and its members sacred. The outward cult is attended with subjective worship, the highest form of which is love to God. This under the influence of mysticism may become a perversion, as M. Guyau considers the worship of Christ to be to a considerable extent. But the love of God contains a moral element, which ultimately transforms it into a moral love, that is, the love of virtue, which expresses itself in good works and the externals of religious worship.

The second part of M. Guyau's work is devoted to a consideration of the dissolution of religions in existing societies, beginning with an examination of the nature of dogmatic faith and its particular dogmas, with especial reference to orthodox Protestantism; the conclusion being that under the influence of science, public instruction, and other agencies, the dissolution of dogmatic faith is inevitable. Such will be the fate also of the symbolic faith which is gradually taking the place of dogmatic faith, especially in Protestant countries under the influence of the teaching of such books as Matthew Arnold's *Literature and Dogma*. M. Guyau's opinion is that religious faith will finally be replaced by moral faith, religion being thus absorbed into morality. Such will be the fate also of the religious morality based upon dogma and faith. The only durable elements of religious morality are respect and love, but love of a personal God will be replaced by love of humanity, which is, however, that of God himself as ideal. This love of the ideal harmonised with the love of humanity will realise itself in action, and religion "having become the purest of all things—pure love of the ideal—will at the same time have become the realest and in appearance the humblest of all things—labor." The remainder of Part II. discusses many practical questions connected with religion. Referring

to the notion that woman is naturally prone to superstition, being governed by sentiment rather than reason, M. Guyau remarks that this is due to the restriction of woman's activity, and he affirms that as her sphere of action is enlarged woman's tendency to mystic impulses and to exercises of piety will be lessened. He has some happy thoughts on the origin and nature of modesty and also of love, which together constitute the strength of woman's disposition to propriety. Much of what M. Guyau says in relation to the religion of woman has reference more particularly to France, and such is the case also with his discussion of the effect of religion and non-religion on population and the future of the race. He considers the problem of population in France and the operation of Malthusianism, which he regards as a worse scourge than pauperism, and he suggests a number of remedies for the sterility which has caused so serious a decrease in the birth-rate. He looks to science to do in the future what religion has done in the past, to secure "the fertility of the race and its physical, moral, and economical education."

What has gone before may be considered as the prelude to the real subject of M. Guyau's exhaustive work—that which gives title to the book itself—the Non-religion of the Future. The author in his Introduction explains why he adopted this title. He states that in many books the "religion of the future" is merely a hypocritical compromise with some form of positive religion, and that he adopted what he regards as the less misleading term "Non-religion of the Future" in opposition to that form of subterfuge. And yet the term is undoubtedly misleading to those accustomed to the English language. M. Guyau remarks that "to be non-religious or a-religious is not to be anti-religious. The non-religion of the future may well preserve all that is pure in the religious sentiment: an admiration for the cosmos and for the infinite powers which are there displayed; a search for an ideal not only individual but social, and even cosmic, which shall overpass the limits of actual reality." He adds that the absence of positive and dogmatic religion is the very form toward which all particular religions tend. Moreover, the developments of religion and those of civilisation have always proceeded hand in hand; "the developments of religion have always proceeded in the line of a greater independence of spirit, of a less literal and less narrow dogmatism, of a freer speculation. Non-religion, as we here understand it, may be considered as a higher degree simply of religion and of civilisation." The distinction here made is strictly that between religion and theology, which has long been insisted on by liberal English writers, and hence M. Guyau's non-religion is in reality religion freed from its dogmatic and supernatural associations. What he enforces is the destruction of dogma and the substitution for it of metaphysical hypothesis, by which is meant speculation having for its aim the solution of the great problem of the origin and destiny of the universe. M. Guyau devotes three chapters to a consideration of the principal metaphysical hypotheses which will replace dogma. These he treats under the heads of Theism, Pantheism—under its optimistic and pessimistic phases—Idealism, Materialism, and Monism. Monism regards matter and mind as two aspects

of one and the same thing, and these two aspects are synthesised as *life*, which is the fundamental conception of philosophy. Life is productivity, and the individual, by the mere fact of growth, tends to become both social and moral. Thus, "to live is to become a conscious, a moral, and ultimately a philosophical being." Hence it is not surprising that M. Guyau finds the highest possible conception in the realm of morals,—that of "a sort of sacred league between the higher beings of the earth and even of the universe, for the advancement of what is good." The great charm of metaphysical hypotheses now is that they give a moral significance to the world, conformable to our own conscience as affectionate and social beings.

This gives us the law, in which the future history of religion may be summed up, "that religious dogmas, transformed at first into simple metaphysical conjectures, reduced later to a certain number of definite hypotheses, among which the individual made his choice on increasingly rational grounds, ultimately came to bear principally on the problem of morals." Thus religious metaphysics will finally result "in a transcendental theory of universality, an ideal sociology embracing in its sweep all the beings that constitute the universe; and this sociology will be founded, not upon physical inductions, like that of the earliest religions, nor upon ontological inductions like that of the first system of metaphysics, but upon the moral conscience of mankind. Animism, theism, pantheism, are destined to fall under the domination of what may be called moralism." Monism is not here included, and, indeed, M. Guyau expressly states elsewhere that he does not purpose to pass judgment upon the pretensions of monism as a system of metaphysics, although the trend of modern thought is towards this system, which is that of evolution. In connexion with it, however, he treats of what is the most interesting part of his subject, the destiny of the human race and the hypothesis of immortality. He regards as the most discouraging aspect of the theory of evolution, the dissolution which appears to be inevitably bound up with it. But the future may not be like the past, as the resources of nature are inexhaustible, and "the conception of an ideal presupposes the existence of a more or less imperfect realisation of it." This hope M. Guyau applies to the future of man, whose immortality he believes to be possible, under the condition of the evolution of life under a superior form. Such immortality may be impersonal, but, on the other hand, it is possible "that what makes individuality limited is not of the essence of personality, of consciousness; perhaps what is best in thought and will may become universal, without ceasing in the best sense to be personal like the *Noûs* of Anaxagoras." The author supposes that within the sphere of consciousness there exists a series of concentric circles "which lie closer and closer about an unfathomable centre, personality." The impersonal immortality of our actions is unquestionable, and this alone is allowed by science. But science is opposed by affection, which protests against death, and thus we have two great opposing forces. Everywhere science is inclined "to sacrifice the individual in the name of natural evolution; love is inclined, in the name of a higher moral and social evolution, to preserve the individual." M.

Guyau finds support for the latter contention in the fact that continuity of existence means continuity of function, and he supposes that, as individual consciousness is a compound of the consciousness of all the cells that are united in the physical organism, thus constituting the individual a society, so the consciousness of different individuals may be able to interpenetrate and thus communicate to each other a new sort of durability, the individual consciousness surviving as a constituent part in a more comprehensive consciousness. According to this view, immortality may be "an ultimate possession acquired by the species, as a whole, for the benefit of all its members." M. Guyau thinks that as the basis of consciousness is inaccessible to science, a still more literal immortality is possible, but he admits that it is all pure speculation, and for him who sees death in "all its brutality," he counsels the resignation of Stoicism, and offers the consolation that "the portion of the immortal patrimony of the human race, which has been entrusted to him and constitutes what is best in him, will endure and increase, and be passed on, without loss, to succeeding generations." We have not space to consider what is to be the future of the practical side of the religious spirit, beyond the bare statement that associations will be formed for intellectual, moral, and æsthetic purposes and that to the worship of the memory of the dead will be added the worship of nature, which will be the true temple of the future. We must now leave M. Guyau's remarkable work, which to wide erudition adds profound thought and which criticises the beliefs and practices that have developed with the growth of mankind in the most charitable spirit and in language so clear and precise that "he who runs may read and understand."

C. STANILAND WAKE.

A MANUAL OF ETHICS. By *John S. Mackenzie, M. A.*, Professor of Logic and Philosophy in the University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire. Third edition. Revised, enlarged, and in part rewritten. University Correspondence College Press. London: W. B. Clive; New York: Hinds & Noble. 1897. Pages, xvi+456. Price, \$1.50.

The favorable reception accorded Professor Mackenzie's *Manual of Ethics* by the class of readers to which it is particularly addressed, may be taken as evidence not only that it supplies a widely-felt want, but that its views recommend themselves to those who are in search of the best thought on the ethical subject. It is not surprising that the book has reached a third edition, which will be welcome, as it enables the author, by the alteration of certain passages and the addition of fresh matter, to remove the impression which had been formed by some persons, that he had given too little weight to ethics as a subject of actual experience in the relations of social life. Like every other form of mental activity, the ethical has a double aspect: one subjective and the other objective, these appearing respectively as Character and Conduct. Professor Mackenzie defines Ethics as the Science of the Ideal in Conduct, and yet, as he points out, the Greek word *ἦθος* means *character*. This forms the real basis of conduct, which thus stands towards character in much